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vs. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The statement of the case and statement of facts are set 
forth previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-6. The Appellant takes 
this opportunity to reply to the Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MR. BABBELL'S PROPERTY VIOLATED 
HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. 
A. DETECTIVE CAZIER'S SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT DID NOT 
AFFORD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUSTAIN ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT TO 
SEARCH AND SEIZE MR. BABBELL*S PROPERTY. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Babbell argued that Detective 
Cazier's "Affidavit for Search Warrant" could not have led a neutral 
magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed for issuing the 
requested warrant. Appellant attacked the affidavit's sufficiency on 
two grounds: First, the affidavit wholly failed to indicate the basis 
for any characterization of Mr. Babbell's alleged "modus operandi," 
and second, the affidavit withheld the truth from the magistrate 
concerning the similarities and the substantial differences between 
the truck witnesses described to Cazier and Mr. Babbell's truck. In 
demonstrating the affidavit's insufficiency under Utah Code Ann. 
§77-23-2, §77-23-3, §77-23-12 (1953 as amended) and under the 
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, Appellant highlighted the only paragraph 
in the affidavit which even mentioned him: 
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and 
the description of the suspect, Detective 
Virgil Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, believed the vehicle may belong to 
William Babbell. The detectives drove by the 
address of the suspect, 8558 South 3830 West, 
and noticed a truck in the driveway that 
matched the description. The suspect's mother, 
a resident at the address, gave the detectives 
permission to look at the truck. (See 
Appellant's Brief, Addendum A). 
In its response to Appellant's argument, the state makes 
three erroneous contentions: (1) the Appellant focused upon only 
one of the affidavit's paragraphs (the one quoted above) when 
evaluating the affidavit's sufficiency rather than viewing the 
affidavit as a whole as required by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 
(1983), (2) Detective Cazier's reference, in his affidavit, to the 
"modus operandi" information he received from Detective Johnson "was 
of little importance in establishing probable cause," and (3) the 
evaluation of the search warrant affidavit should be governed by the 
Gates "totality of the circumstances" standard rather than the 
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Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, in part because the affidavit under 
scrutiny in this case does not contain information received from an 
informant. (see Respondent's Brief at pp. 9-12). The state also 
erroneously concludes, summarily and without demonstration, that 
Detective Cazier's affidavit "provided a substantial basis upon 
which the magistrate could have concluded that probable cause 
existed for the issuance of the warrant." (Respondent's Brief at p. 
10). 
In reply, Mr. Babbell contends that he did evaluate the 
affidavit as a whole and that when so viewed the affidavit does not 
supply probable cause to sustain the issuance of a warrant under 
either the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines or the Gates "totality of the 
circumstances" standard. Appellant further contends that the 
affidavit does contain the tip of an informant, albeit a fellow 
officer.* Yet nowhere does the affidavit supply the magistrate with 
any indication of the factual basis for the tip, nor does the 
affidavit indicate whether the affiant ever bothered to substantiate 
the volunteered "modus operandi" information. In addition, as 
indicated above, the affidavit fails to indicate how the Appellant's 
truck matched the witnesses' descriptions of the assailant's truck. 
Without significantly more particularized information before him 
during his probable cause deliberations, the magistrate below had no 
^By way of reply to the state's second contention (see the 
enumerated contentions immediately above), it can simply be noted 
that the "modus operandi" tip supplied to Cazier was one of the 
listed "facts" linking Appellant to the assault on Ms. Sine; it is 
entirely unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that the circuit court 
magistrate did not rely (perhaps centrally) upon the tip in his 
probable cause deliberations. 
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"substantial basis" for issuing the requested warrant. State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985) (citing Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (I960)). 
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984) this 
Court acknowledged that "even under [the Gates totality of the 
circumstances] standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
guidelines may.be necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable 
cause." Regardless of whether the Court is prepared to announce 
that the Aguilar-Spinelli test for the sufficiency of an affidavit 
is mandated by Art. I Section 14 of the the state Constitution2 (see 
Respondent's Brief at p. 12), Appellant contends that the present 
case is precisely one of those situations alluded to in Bailey 
requiring the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli safeguards. While 
2The Washington Supreme Court serves as a prime example of 
a court which refuses to follow the lead of the Gates decision and 
instead continues to rely on the sensible and well established 
Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine. As the Washington Court stated in 
State . Jackson, 688 P.2d 135, 139 (Wash. 1984): 
Underlying the Aguilar-Spinelli test is the basic 
belief that the determination of probable cause 
to issue a warrant must be made by a magistrate, 
not law enforcement officers who seek warrants. 
To perform the constitutionally prescribed 
function, rather than being a rubber stamp, a 
magistrate requires an affidavit which informs 
him of the underlying circumstances which led the 
officer to conclude that the informant was 
credible and obtained the information in a 
reliable way. Only in this way (as the Court 
emphasized in Aguilar and Spinelli) can the 
magistrate make the proper independent judgment 
about the persuasiveness of the facts relied upon 
by the officer to show probable cause. Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 412-16, 89 S.Ct. at 586-89; Aguilar, 
378 U.S. at 110-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1511-14. 
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there are no cases directly on point to assist the Court in the 
present analysis, Mr. Babbell nevertheless maintains that a 
magistrate presented with the affidavit at issue in this case must 
ask for the factual basis of the volunteered information in order to 
protect against any possibility of police harassment or mistake. 
An Aguilar-Spinelli inquiry into the sufficiency of a 
search warrant affidavit requires common sense scrutiny of both the 
veracity of the informant (in our case, Detective Johnson) and the 
informant's basis of knowledge. Mr. Babbell does not suggest that 
the circuit court magistrate should have questioned the reliability 
of Officer Johnson (unless he had previously misinformed the 
court). The factual basis of the "modus operandi" information 
relayed to Detective Cazier, however, could in no way have been 
demonstrated by the mere invocation of Johnson's reliability. 
Indeed, as the Washington Supreme Court has warned, "a strong 
showing of general trustworthiness should not compensate for failure 
to explain how the informant came by his information. The qualities 
that demonstrate trustworthiness have nothing to do with 
demonstrating the basis of knowledge on a particular occasion." 
(emphasis added). State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 142 (Wash. 
1984). Surely the Aguilar-Spinelli jurisprudence espoused by the 
Washington Court—requiring that each prong of the sufficiency 
inquiry have independent status in insuring the validity of the 
information—applies as fully to information derived from a fellow 
officer as it does to information derived from a reliable, long time 
police informant. 
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Even if this Court concludes that the present case does not 
warrant application of the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines, still 
Detective Cazier's affidavit failed to afford probable cause under 
the Gates analysis. In Gates, the Supreme Court indicated that the 
magistrate's "practical, common sense" review of all of the facts 
and circumstances set forth in the affidavit must include an inquiry 
into the "veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying 
hearsay information." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 
(1983).^ Detective Johnson is clearly a person who supplied 
"hearsay information" to Detective Cazier. Therefore, even under 
Gates, the magistrate in this case should have sought some assurance 
that Johnson knew what he was talking about. The dangers of 
mistaken identity or possible police harassment are simply too 
palpable to be ignored. 
The present case -contrasts readily with Bailey, supra, and 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985). Unlike the case at 
bar, the circuit court magistrates in both Bailey and Anderson were 
faced with situations in which there existed substantial indicia of 
both the informant's reliability and a verified factual basis of the 
3The principal difference between the Gates approach and 
the Aguilar-Spinelli rule is that "veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge", while still relevant, are no longer both essential. 
Under Gates, a "deficiency" on either of these "prongs" may "be 
compensated for "by a "strong showing" on the other prong. Gates, 
103 S.Ct. at 2329. The "totality of the circumstances" analysis 
downgrades the veracity and basis of knowledge elements and makes 
them only "relevant considerations." Gates, 103 S.Ct. 15 2329. 
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informant's tip. In Bailey, this Court stressed the 
importance—under the Gates test—of "prior verification of [an 
informant's] significant facts" carefully outlined and set out on 
the face of the affidavit. Bailey at 1206. Similarly in Anderson/ 
the importance of independent verification of a tip was stressed as 
was the importance of the detail with which the informant conveyed 
the tip. Anderson at 1102. 
In the present case, the circuit court magistrate was 
presented with no more than the bald allegation that Mr. Babbell's 
"modus operandi" was the same as the assailant's and that his truck 
had been seen by the police and apparently "matched" the description 
of the assailant's truck. (see Appellant's Brief, Addendum A). 
While Detective Cazier did verify that Appellant owned a brown truck 
prior to seeking a warrant, at no time did he verify the "modus 
operandi" information. The "Affidavit for Search Warrant" simply 
contained no details supporting Detective Johnson's knowledge about 
Mr. Babbell's alleged "modus operandi." The affidavit was further 
weakened by failing to indicate how Appellant's truck matched the 
one described by witnesses. 
Detective Cazier's affidavit did not supply the magistrate 
below with anything like the detailed information ordinarily 
required to afford probable cause to issue a search warrant. 
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1. All evidence seized pursuant to the illegally 
issued warrant must be suppressed. 
Without reiterating the strong policy reasons for utilizing 
the Mapp standard for determining the suppressibility of evidence 
(see Appellant's Brief at pp. 15-16 and 20-24), Mr. Babbell contends 
that the evidence seized from his truck and home must be suppressed 
since the warrant authorizing the seizure was issued without 
probable cause. Even if this Court does not adopt the Mapp standard 
as a state Constitutional protection and instead employs the Leon 
test or as yet untried Rule 12(g) test for the propriety of 
suppression, still the evidence seized in this case must be 
suppressed because of the substantial bad faith with which the 
police procured and exercised the warrant (see Appellant's Brief at 
pp. 17-20 and 24-26). 
B. MR. BABBELLfS THREEFOLD CHALLENGE TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THOSE ITEMS WHICH WERE SEIZED 
BUT WHICH WERE NOT LISTED ON THE WARRANT WAS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
Prior to trial below, the district court judge who heard 
the case convened a suppression hearing. At that hearing Mr. 
Babbell argued that all property seized pursuant to the illegally 
issued warrant should be suppressed. Appellant further argued that 
those items which were seized but which were not listed on the face 
of the warrant were inadmissible because: (1) the items were not 
specifically described on the warrant as items to be seized, and (2) 
the items could not justifiably be seized under the plain view 
doctrine. After a fullblown suppression hearing on these matters, 
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the court suppressed some of the unlisted items and stated that the 
remainder would be admissible (see Appellant's Brief at p. 6). At 
trial, defense counsel (fully cognizant of this Court's ruling in 
State v, Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983)) lodged her pro forma 
objection to the admissibility of the unlisted items by stating: 
As I conveyed to the Court at the bench, I_ 
believe that in order to preserve my objections 
to the ruling that the Court gave at the previous 
motion to suppress, I need to, again, enter my 
objection for the record based upon the 
Defendant's Motion that not only were the items 
which the Court has suppressed illegally seized, 
but that the items which have now been introduced 
and which were not suppressed by the Court at the 
time of the suppression hearing, were also 
illegally seized. 
Again, our basis for that is that the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant was statutorily 
insufficient. And that the Justice of the Peace 
or the Circuit Court Judge, who issued that, did 
not have probable cause or could not have found 
probable cause in which to issue such a search 
warrant. And I understand that the Court will 
allow me this motion as though it were made at" 
the time that those items were first mentioned. 
(R. 380) (emphasis added). 
In its brief, at page 45, the state quotes this pro forma 
objection and indicates that because the objection reiterates only 
one ground of attack (i.e., the affidavit was insufficient) the 
other two challenges to the admissibility of the seized evidence 
were not preserved for appeal under Lesley (requiring that a 
specific objection to evidence be made at trial even if a pretrial 
suppression hearing is conducted). Mr. Babbell contends that the 
state's assertion is without merit. 
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When defense counsel lodged her objection to the admission 
of the flashlight and button, she effectively announced that it was 
a pro forma objection meant to comply with the dictates of Lesley. 
Counsel made the objection after some of the unlisted items had come 
into evidence, and did so in order to "preserve [her] objections" to 
the court's ruling at the earlier, exhaustively conducted 
suppression hearing (R. 380). Further, counsel made explicit 
reference to all of her earlier objections to the admissibility of 
the evidence, and thereby incorporated them into the objection at 
trial, when she indicated her unequivocal intention "to preserve 
[her] objections to the ruling that the Court gave at the previous 
motion to suppress." (Id.). Defense Counsel clearly complied with 
both the letter and the spirit of the Lesley rule by specifically 
raising, at trial, all objections to the evidence which she had made 
at the pretrial hearing. 
Mr. Babbell also maintains that the rationale underpinning 
the Lesley opinion clearly indicates the inapplicability of the 
waiver rule to the facts in this case. In Lesley, Justice Durham 
indicated that "the reasons for [the waiver] rule are well 
illustrated in this case": 
The judge who heard the motion to suppress was 
not the trial judge, and there is no indication 
in the record before us that an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion was conducted. There are 
no findings of fact, conclusions of law, or any 
written rulings with respect to the appellant's 
motion to suppress. Prior to trial, a judge is 
often in a disadvantaged position to decide on 
the admissibility of evidence. The trial judge 
is likely to have a more complete view of the 
grounds for excluding or admitting certain 
evidence. When defense counsel fails to call the 
trial judge's attention to any problems regarding 
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the admissibility of evidence at the time it is 
offered, he or she deprives the trial court of an 
opportunity to avoid error in the trial which may 
have been created by an improper ruling on a 
pretrial motion based on inadequate information, 
(emphasis added), 
672 P.2d at 82. In the present case, the trial judge was in no way 
"in a disadvantaged position" to rule on the admissibility of the 
disputed evidence. He conducted a fullblown suppression hearing 
during which he was briefed by both sides. Following the hearing 
the court carefully scrutinized the suppression arguments by taking 
them under advisement. Clearly the present case is far from the 
Lesley situation in which the judge who tries the case is not the 
one who conducted the pretrial hearing. Defense counsel knew 
precisely what the trial judge would rule in this case when she 
lodged her proforma objection. This is decidedly not a case in 
which counsel risked depriving "the trial court of an opportunity to 
avoid error in the trial which may have been created by an improper 
ruling on a pretrial motion based on inadequate information." 
For the foregoing reasons, defense counsel's objection at 
trial preserved POINT 1(D) (see Appellant's Brief at p. 24) for 
appellate review. 
POINT II 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
HAD THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY BEEN SUPPRESSED, 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT. 
As Appellant indicated in his opening brief, the state's 
principal evidence in this case was: (1) the victim's 
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identification of William Babbell, and (2) the property illegally 
seized from Babbell residence and vehicles. (Appellant's Brief at 
p. 29). In light of the extraordinary discrepancy between the 
victim's description of her assailant and Mr. Babbell's physical 
characteristics (see Appellant's Brief at pp. 3 and 30), had the 
illegally seized property been properly suppressed reasonable minds 
could not have found Mr. Babbell guilty of the crimes charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
The State contends that Appellant's insufficiency argument 
is "little more than a request for this Court to engage in cte novo 
review of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses." (Respondent's Brief at p. 49). Quite to the contrary, 
however, Mr. Babbell's argument simply urges the Court to review the 
record below for insufficiency of the evidence—pursuant to the 
guidelines announced in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1983)—in light of the Court's recent warnings concerning eyewitness 
identification. See, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 
requiring that trial courts give a cautionary instruction whenever 
eyewitness identification is central to a case). 
In Long this Court recognized that all significant, state 
of the art studies "lead inexorably to the conclusion that human 
perception is inexact and human memory is both limited and 
fallible." 721 P.2d at 488. The Court also acknowledged that, in 
cases such as the present one, "when an observer is experiencing a 
marked degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to decrease 
significantly" (citation omitted). Icl. at 489. Further, the Court 
noted that "as eyewitnesses wend their way through the criminal 
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justice process, their reports of what was seen and heard tend to 
become 'more accurate, more complete and less ambiguous' in 
appearance," and that "the accuracy of an identification is, at 
times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is made" 
(citations omitted), Td. at 490. 
Mr. Babbell simply and respectfully urges this Court to 
recall the compelling impetus for the Long opinion when reviewing 
the record in the present case: "the annals of criminal law are 
rife with instances of mistaken identification." United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, 
Appellant urges this court to reverse his convictions and dismiss 
the charges against him, or, alternatively, remand his case for a 
new trial. 
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